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An Emerging Framework for Greater
Foreign Participation in the Economies
of Hungary and Poland
By STEVEN A. VELKEI*
Member of the Class of 1992
I. INTRODUCTON
Hungary and Poland are currently in the midst of a grand experi-
ment: the transition of economies dominated by the hegemony of state
control into free market economies with Western institutions.' This
transition requires monumental changes. "To function efficiently, mod-
em market economies rely heavily on institutions and rules established
over a century or more: property and contract laws and the courts to
enforce them; accounting and bankruptcy rules .... Governments in
Eastern Europe have only begun to think about most of these issues." 2
The enormity of this transition requires massive and unprecedented re-
course to the law.3
The creation of legislation regulating the entry and operation of for-
eign capital is a small but important aspect of the transition to a market
economy. Both the Hungarian and Polish governments attach great
hopes to the role the foreign investor will play in bringing important
technology, expertise, and capital to the badly depressed markets. One
commentator has described this desire as an obsession.4 Despite this,
Western investors have found doing business in Eastern Europe bureau-
cratic and time consuming. Confusion over the new laws and the ques-
tions of ownership have hampered many negotiations.5
This Note will first examine the extent to which the legislation regu-
* A.B., Princeton University, 1987.
1. Jeffrey Sachs & David Lipton, Poland's Economic Reforms, 69 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 47
(Win. 1990/1991).
2. Jam Tomorrow, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, survey at 3, 4.
3. Herbert Izdebsld, A Revival of Commercial Law in the Soviet Union and Other Euro-
pean Socialist Countries, 15 REv. OF Soc. L. 365, 366 (1989).
4. Catalysts, not saviours, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, survey at 24.
5. 1, See also Stephen Engelberg, Eastern Europe Stymies ,411 But The Hardiest of West-
ern Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, at Al, C8.
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lating foreign investment in Poland and Hungary establishes, controls,
and encourages the entry of foreign capital. Second, it will analyze the
extent to which this legislation has promulgated a rule of law. It is more
likely that the concerns of the foreign investor will be satisfied to the
extent that the legislation creates a system of rule by law.
Although theorists differ on the meaning of the term, commentators
seem to agree on a number of major institutional characteristics that go
to the heart of investor concerns. Some of the major institutional charac-
teristics of the "rule of law" include government under the law, where
the law precludes arbitrary actions, certainty, generality and equality, ac-
cessibility of the courts, and judicial review of executive action. 6 The
"rule of law" should not, however, be strictly construed to be a positive
force in all instances. Strict rule of law must be weighed against the need
for flexibility. 7
Finally, this Note will address the present status of foreign owner-
ship rights and questions of ownership which remain unresolved. Own-
ership laws are only one of a number of strategically important areas of
the host country's legal system, with which a foreign investor must be-
come familiar.8 While this Note cannot address many of these important
subjects in anything but a cursory way, the resolution of the ownership
question is of prime importance to the entry and operation of foreign
capital.
Ultimately, the conclusions drawn from this Note are intended to be
used in developing constructive changes in the foreign investment laws of
Hungary and Poland. They may also help create a model which can be
applied to other Eastern European countries since the logic of change
and the economic alternatives remain similar for all the countries of
Eastern Europe.9
II. HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
SOCIALIST AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES
The idea that foreign investors did not participate in the socialist
6. See GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW, FOUNDATION OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 24-41 (1988). It is important to note, however, that certainty must be
weighed against the need for flexibility. Id. at 26.
7. Id.
8. INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO WORKING WITH
FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD 110 (David N. Goldsweig et al. eds., 1990).
9. See KIlmfn Mizsei, Is the Hungarian Economic Mechanism a Model to be Emulated?,
E. EUR. ECON. Summer 1988, at 58.
[Vol. 15
Foreign Participation in Hungary & Poland
economies of Hungary and Poland is mistaken. As early as the 1970s,
foreign investment played a role in both economies.
Foreign participation in the socialist economies of Hungary and Po-
land, however, involved a great degree of ambiguity. In Hungary, the
terms of foreign participation remained subject to ministerial decrees
published by the Minister of Finance."0 In Poland, multiple and conflict-
ing pieces of legislation regulated foreign participation."
Equally, foreign participation involved pervasive government con-
trol, characteristic of a strong state seeking to contain capitalist influ-
ences. 12 In all cases of foreign participation, the Hungarian and Polish
states required approval of the venture and the scope of the venture's
activities, even though the foreign stake generally represented a minority
position."3 Failure to abide by the terms of the permit had significant
consequences. In Hungary, for example, the activity of the venture had
to be explicitly laid out in the memorandum of association. If the Minis-
10. Decree No. 28 of 1972 on Economic Associations With Foreign Participation, as
amended by Decree No. 7 of 1977, Decree No. 35 of 1978, Decree No. 63 of 1982, and Order
No. 5 of 1979 of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance [hereinafter Hungarian Decree No. 63/
1982]. At no point did legislation govern foreign investment except in extremely limited cases
of wholly owned ventures under article 25 of the Foreign Trade Act. See F. Mad], Hungary, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OP JoINT VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE 74 (D. Campbell ed., 1986).
11. As early as the 1970s, legislation accorded separate treatment for wholly owned ven-
tures and joint ventures. Wholly foreign owned ventures were governed by a separate statute
which allowed foreign operation in light industries such as crafts, domestic trade, food service,
and hospitality. Christina L. Jadach, Ownership and Investment in Poland, 18 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 63, 75 (1985). Joint ventures with foreign participants could only operate in areas under
regional supervision and foreign participation was limited to 49%. Id. at 76.
In the 1980s, two parallel investment schemes existed in Poland, each operating on differ-
ent principles: the "System of 1982" and the "System of 1986." David Gordon, The Polish
Foreign Investment Law of 1990, 24 INT'L LAWYER 335, 339 (1990). These pieces of legisla-
tion significantly complicated the terms of foreign participation. See id. at 337-40. In 1982 the
government passed legislation to encourage foreign investment in small industry (the "System
of 1982"). Id at 338; Law of July 6, 1982, Act on Principals of Carrying on Economic Activ-
ity in Small Industry on the Territory of the Polish People's Republic by Foreign Juridical and
Natural Persons, in COMMERCIAL, BusiNEss AND TRADE LAWS, POLAND 1 (Jerry Rajski ed.,
1985). It placed no limitation upon the foreign investor's equity share unless justified by eco-
nomic or social considerations. Id art. 14. It failed, however, to define the term "small indus-
try" and put the scope of the 1982 law in doubt. Previous limitations continued to exist on
joint ventures not governed by the 1982 law. Jadach, supra, at 76-77. In 1986 new legislation
was passed, which expanded the permissible activity of joint ventures. 1986 Law on Companies
With Foreign Participation, [hereinafter 1986 law]. The 1986 law operated in conjuction with
the 1982 legislation, Id art. 41(1); see also Gordon, supra, at 337-40, leaving the jurisdiction
of the two law in doubt.
12. See, e-g., K. Malfliet, The Hungarian Questfor a Valid Theory of"Socialist" Property:
Still A Long Way to Go, 13 REv. SOCIALIST L. 241, 250 (1987).
13. See Hungarian Decree No. 63/1982; 1986 Polish Law on Companies with Foreign
Participation art. 7.
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ter of Finance determined that the venture exceeded the scope of its ac-
tivity, the Minister had the authority to terminate the venture.' 4
Both Hungary and Poland limited foreign equity participation to a
minority share (i.e. no more than forty-nine percent) in any venture with
a state enterprise,15 subject to certain exceptions. In Poland, wholly for-
eign owned ventures could operate in certain light industries.' 6 In Hun-
gary, a foreign investor could own a majority share in a service
enterprise, such as banking, or in another type of business in the discre-
tion of the Minister of Finance.17
Where the state allowed wholly owned ventures, the state strictly
limited the scope of the activity. Although one commentator on Poland
wrote, "Western commentators have taken ideology far more seriously
than have their Polish counterparts," 8 the existence of wholly foreign
owned ventures in Poland did not reflect a substantial violation of Marx-
ist ideology. Legislation limited foreign participation to a specified seg-
ment of the economy: small industry. The limited application in
Hungary could be regulated by the discretion of the Ministry of
Finance. 19
III. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE TRANSFORMING
ECONOMIES
In 1988 the first comprehensive statutes on foreign investment
passed in the legislatures of Hungary and Poland. The Hungarian legis-
lature passed Act XXIV of 1988 on Investments of Foreigners in Hun-
gary, and the Polish Sejm passed the Law of 1988 on Economic Activity
with the Participation of Foreign Parties.2" This legislation represented a
comprehensive approach to foreign participation in the Hungarian and
Polish economies and permitted freer entry of foreign capital. It gov-
erned wholly owned/unlimited equity share ventures, joint ventures, and
foreign participation in the privatization of industry in the newly trans-
14. Hungarian Decree No. 63/1982, § 12(3).
15. Id See also note 11 for examples of light industries in which the Polish government
allowed foreign capital participation.
16. Jadach, supra note 11, at 75.
17. Hungarian Decree No. 63/1982, § 4.
18. Jadach, supra note 11, at 69.
19. Hungarian Decree No. 63/1982, § 4.
20. The Law on Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties, 28 I.L.M.
1518 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law]. This statute repealed the 1986
Act on Companies With Foreign Capital Participation. Id. art. 44, 28 I.L.M. at 1541, and
provided that the "System of 1982" be phased out by providing that no more companies could
be formed under this act after January 1, 1989. Id. art. 49, 28 I.L.M. at 1541.
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forming economies."
In the subsequent two years, the Hungarian and Polish governments
began to privatize the majority of industry by passing a series of legisla-
tion. In Hungary, the principal pieces of legislation are Act XIII of 1989
on the Transformation of Business Organizations and Companies (Hun-
garian Privatization Law) and Laws No. VII and VIII of 1990 on the
State Property Agency. 2 In Poland, the principal pieces of legislation
are the Law of 1990 on Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (Polish
Privatization Law), together with the Law on the Establishment of the
Ministry of Ownership Changes (M.O.C.).
In 1990 and 1991, the Polish and Hungarian governments changed
the substantive provisions of its foreign investment legislation. Poland
repealed the 1988 Act,2 after having amended it in 1989, under the Law
of June 14, 1991 on Companies with Foreign Participation.24 In 1990
Hungary amended its 1988 legislation pursuant to Act XCVII of
1990. The present forms of foreign investment legislation have substan-
tially changed the previous regulatory structure, by relaxing restrictions
on foreign capital's entry and operation.
A. Scope of the Foreign Investment Laws
The foreign investment laws are the principal form of regulation of
foreign capital in Hungary and Poland. Polish and Hungarian foreign
investment laws apply to most areas of foreign investment. The Hun-
garian statute applies to companies with foreign participation, companies
set up by a foreigner, and the acquisition by a foreigner of equity in a
company.26 The present Polish foreign investment statute applies gener-
ally to any participation of foreign parties in operating businesses in
Poland.27
21. Unified Text of Act XXIV of 1988 regarding investments by nonresidents in Hungary
with subsequent amendments and supplements [hereinafter Amended Hungarian Foreign In-
vestment Law] § 4, 2 HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE [hereinafter H.R.LF.] 305, 306
(1991); 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law art. 2(l), art. 4, 28 IL.M. at 1520, 1540.
22. The flil names of these pieces of legislation are Law No. VII 1990 on the State Prop-
erty Agency and on Management of Property of the State Operating in Enterprises [herrei-
nafter Hungarian Law No. VII of 1990] and Law No. VIII 1990 on Protection of State
Property Entrusted to Enterprises [hereinafter Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990].
23. Poland: Law on Companies with Foreign Participation [hereinafter 1991 Polish For-
eign Investment Law], art. 43(1), 30 I.L.M. 871, 889 (1991).
24. Iai art. 43, 30 I.L.M. at 889.
25. Act XCVIII of 1990 on the Amendment to Act XXIV of 1988 on Investments by
Foreigners in Hungary, 2 HI.R.L.F. 190 (1990).
26. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 2(b), 2 H.R L.F. at 305.
27. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law art. 1(1), 30 I.L.M. at 875. There is an interest-
1992"i
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The foreign investment statutes, however, are not the exclusive in-
struments for regulation. Article 2 of the Polish Foreign Investment
Law states that the provisions of the law "do not affect other laws estab-
lishing conditions for the admission of foreign parties .... ,28 Other laws
include legislation relating to foreign exchange, 29 the admission of for-
eign parties into certain specialized industries such as the financial indus-
try30 and telecommunications, and the purchase of real property by
foreigners.31
The privatization laws also impose important conditions on the en-
try of foreign capital and overlap with the provisions of the foreign in-
vestment legislation. In Hungary, the privatization statutes impose
conditions on foreign entry even though the foreign investment legisla-
tion would appear to govern. Law No. VIII on the State Property
Agency regulates foreign participation in companies formed with or
utilizing state assets32 and the acquisition of shares in a newly privatized
company. 33 These regulations impose conditions which differ -from the
corresponding provisions in the foreign investment law.
In Poland, there is less overlap between the privatization laws and
the foreign investment law. First, the present version of the Polish for-
eign investment law governs transactions between slate enterprises and
foreign individuals.34 Second, it repealed those provisions of the Priva-
ing discrepancy between the Polish and Hungarian definitions of "foreign person." Under
article 3 of the Polish statute, a foreign person is any natural person domiciled abroad, a legal
person with their registered office abroad or a company which lacks legal personality but is
created according to foreign law. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law art. 3, 30 I.L.M. at
875. The Hungarian statute, under section 2(a), only defines foreigner to include an individ-
ual or corporation under the rules of Exchange Control. Amended Hungarian Foreign Invest-
ment Law § 2(a), 2 H.R.L.F. at 305-06. It is uncertain, therefore, what impact the laws have
upon a partnership which invests in Hungary.
28. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law art. 2, 30 I.L.M. at 875.
29. See, eg., Polish Foreign Exchange Law of February 15, 1989.
30. See, e.g., Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 47, 2 H.R.L.F. at 318,
which states that the foreign investment law does not relate to creation of banks with foreign
participation. Id. Hungarian Act II of 1979 governs the creation of banks with foreign partic-
ipation. In Poland, see Banking Law of January 31, 1989 (amended on Dec. 28, 1989), in
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, POLAND: THE NEW BUSINESS FRONTIER 1 (1990).
31. March 24, 1920 Act on the Purchase of Real Estate by Foreign Investors, Dziennik
Ustaw, 1933, no. 24, item 202; Act I of 1987, The Act of Land, I H.R.L.F. 547 (with all
amendments up to Feb. 14, 1990), and additional amendments Act XXXVII of 1990 on
amending and supplementing Act I of 1987 on Land, 2 H.R.L.F. 243, Act XXXVIII of 1990
on amending and supplementing Act I of 1987 on Land, 2 H.R.L.F. 245.
32. Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990 art. 1(1).
33. Id.
34. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law art. 6, 30 I.L.M. at 876-77.
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tization Law which separately regulated foreign investment. 5 Any pro-
visions specifically dealing with foreign investment have been put in the
Law of June 14, 1991. The Polish Privatization Law previously estab-
lished separate approval requirements as well as separate provisions re-
garding profit repatriation and tax.3' The government, however, retains
its powers under the privatization statutes, to control the transfer of
shares to foreign parties.37
Finally, neither the Hungarian nor the Polish statute specifically
governs franchising arrangements with foreign parties,38 placing the for-
eign franchisor in an uncertain legal position. Although franchising ar-
rangements typically involve many of the same concerns affecting other
forms of investment covered by foreign investment legislation,39 the
franchisor's concerns are not protected by the statute. Such concerns
include currency convertibility and profit repatriation, the possibility of
expropriation, and questions of ownership of real property. Where the
concerns are more particular to the franchisor, including intellectual
property rights and the enforceability of contracts which restrict the
franchisee's rights,' the franchisor may not be adequately protected by
existing legislation or bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.
B. The Government Role in the Admission and Participation of
Foreign Investment
1. Regulation in the Private Sector
The present legislation in Hungary and Poland has the principal ef-
fect of creating a rough equality between foreign and domestic investors
with respect to transactions in the private sector. The preamble to the
amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law statute explicitly reflects
this objective. The preamble in its amended form states,
The parliament has enacted this statute in support of the following
objectives that is to say: to develop international cooperation and spe-
cifically in the interest of promoting technological advance in the Hun-
garian economy inter alia through promoting a direct involvement of
foreign capital in our economy; assuring foreign investors equaled treat-
35. See id art. 33, 30 I.L.M. at 885-86.
36. See Poland: Law on Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises [hereinafter Polish
Privatization Law] arts. 33-36, 29 I.L.M. 1226 (1990).
37. Id. art. 19 (1), 29 IL.M. 1226.
38. In fact, no Eastern European country has adopted legislation directly affecting
franchising. Philip F. Zeidman & Michael Avner, Franchising in Eastern Europe, I
P.S.S.E.E.L. 6 (1991).
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 6-7.
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ment to Hungarian nationals and elimination of any adverse
discrimination.4
1
The preamble to the 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law does not state
this objective, but the statute in fact achieves this objective by eliminating
state approval of foreign participation in most areas.42
Prior to the passage of the present foreign investment laws, foreign
investment in Hungary and Poland had to be approved by the state. In
Hungary, the 1988 legislation required government permission for for-
eign participation where the foreign entity had a controlling interest.43
In Poland, the state exercised a degree of control over the investment
which was disproportionate to any fear of foreign exploitation. Any lim-
ited liability company or joint stock company with foreign participation"
required a permit issued by the Foreign Investment Agency before the
company could commence activity.45 The creation ofa company with as
little as twenty percent foreign participation, the minimum investment
allowed by law, required an approval permit.4 1 Other acts were also sub-
ject to approval, including a transfer of shares or an ownership interest in
the company; amendment of the company's founding act; a change in the
ratio of equity holdings, the voting rights of shareholders or the nature
and value of contributions; or any change in the object of the company's
activity as specified in the permit.47
The provisions of Hungarian Act XCVIII of 1990 eliminate any
need for government authorization for foreign participation. The statute
reads, "[n]o specific exchange control permission is required for the crea-
tion of or acquiring an interest in a company with foreign participa-
41. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law, pmbl., 2 H.R.L.F. at 305 (emphasis
added).
42. See 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law arts. 1-6, 30 I.L.M. at 875-77. Other provi-
sions within the statutes also promote this objective. In Hungary, a state enterprise or finan-
cial institution has no special status where over-subscription requires rejection of some
investors. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 13(1), 2 H.R.L.F. at 308. A com-
pany with foreign participation is entitled to tax concessions due other companies, id. § 15(1),
2 H.R.L.F. at 308; may acquire real property, id. § 19, 2 H.R.L.F. at 311; may pursue anly
wholesale or retail trade or engage in foreign trade under the laws applicable to other business
organizations, id. § 21, 2 H.R.L.F. at 311. A non-resident may also be appointed as an execu-
tive, manager, member of the supervisory board, or other employee. Id. § 27, 2 HR.L.F. at
312.
43. Former Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 9(2).
44. The statute referred to these companies as those "established jointly by Polish parties
and foreign parties, or solely by foreign parties." 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law art.
2(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1520.
45. Id. art. 5(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1522.
46. Id. arts. 2(1), 5(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1520, 1522.
47. Id. art. 5(3), 28 I.L.M. at 1522.
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tion."4 8 A company need only register with the court of registry,
pursuant to Act VI on Business Organizations which governs the crea-
tion of a company with foreign participation,49 to become a valid com-
pany under Hungarian law.50 Significantly, Act XCVIII repealed the
prohibition against acquisition of a controlling interest in a domestic
company by a foreign controlled company.51
Similarly, the Polish Foreign Investment Law substantially reduces,
while not entirely eliminating, the role of government approval in the
private sector. The statute requires state approval in a specific and lim-
ited number of areas of the economy which involve state interests.52
Under Article 4(1) of the statute, a company with foreign participation
cannot be created without permit approval when the company's business
would involve the operation of harbors or airports,53 real estate broker-
age activities,' the defense industry not requiring a concession," whole-
sale trade56 of imported consumer goods57 and performance of legal
services58 (collectively hereinafter 4(1) areas). These proscriptions in the
Polish Foreign Investment Law also apply to activities of an existing
company which wants to expand into the 4(1) areas.59 The law also lim-
its the acquisition of shares in an existing company which carries on ac-
tivity in the 4(1) areas' or activities requiring a concession by virtue of
other regulations.61
48. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 9(2), 2 H.RLLF. at 307; Act XCVIII
of 1990 on the Amendment to Act XXIV of 1988 on Investments by Foreigners in Hungary
1, 2 H.R.L.F. 190, 190 (Feb. 15, 1991).
49. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 3, 2 H.R.L.F. at 306. See also id.
§ 35, 2 H.R.L.F. at 314, which reads, "Unless otherwise specifically enacted hereby the com-
pany in its trading activities is not subject to the regulations which are not part of the civil law
and which only apply to economic organisations of the state and to co-operatives in such
capacity."
50. See Hungarian Law No. VI of 1988 on Business Organizations § 23; Amended Hun-
garian Foreign Investment Law § 5, 2 H.R.L.F. at 306.
51. Act XCVIII § 13(2); Former Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 4(3).
52. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law art. 4(l), 30 I.LM. at 875. See also id. art. 39,
30 I.L.M. at 887, explaining that provisions applicable to state enterprises do not apply to
companies with foreign participation.
53. Id art. 4(1)(a), 30 I.L.M. at 876.
54. Id art. 4(1)(b), 30 I.L.M. at 876.
55. Id art. 4(1)(c), 30 I.L.M. at 876.
56. This language may be subject to a great deal of ambiguity.
57. Id art. 4(1)(d), 30 LL.M. at 876.
58. Id art. 4(1)(e), 30 I.L.M. at 876.
59. Id art. 6(l)(1), 30 I.L.M. at 876.
60. Id art. 6(1)(1)(a), 30 I.L.M. at 876.
61. Id art. 6(1)(1)(b), 30 LL.M. at 876. In the case of activities requiring concessions
pursuant to other regulations, the appropriate licensing authority and not the Ministry of
Ownership Transformations issues the approval or denial. Id art. 8, 30 I.LM. at 877.
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2. Regulation of Transactions Between Foreign Investors and
State Enterprises
The governments of Hungary and Poland continue to substantially
regulate transactions between foreign individuals and state enterprises.
The continuing use of the joint venture in Poland and Hungary under-
scores the importance of these provisions. In 1989, 867 joint ventures
had been established in Poland and 180 in Hungary.62 In 1990 the num-
bers markedly increased to 2,799 in Poland and 4,400 in Hungary. 63 In
the first quarter of 1991, 4,000 joint ventures had been established in
Poland and 2,420 in Hungary. 64 Though many of these joint ventures
are small or only exist on paper,65 the form of joint venture has been
applied on a much larger scale. For example, on February 28, 1992,
General Motors agreed to a seventy-five million dollar joint venture with
the Polish state enterprise, FSO.66
In Hungary, the approval requirements under the present regula-
tions are stricter than under the previous legislation. In the Former
Hungarian Foreign Investment Law, the statute only required govern-
ment approval of a company formed with state and foreign participation
if the foreign interest exceeded fifty percent.67 Now, any transaction be-
tween a state enterprise and a foreign investor invoving significant state
assets 68 requires government approval. 69
Under the privatization laws, the Hungarian government has the
power to review any transaction between a state enterprise and a foreign
investor, including joint ventures, pursuant to Law No. VIII of 1990.
The statute provides that any in-kind distribution or transfer of state as-
sets to an economic association7' is subject to the approval of the State
62. Too Many Firms, Too Few Buyers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at survey 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Stephen Engelberg, G.M. Venture to Build Opel Cars in Poland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,
1992, § 1, at 37.
67. Former Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 9.
68. See generally Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990, art. 1.
69. Id. Before the passage of the statute, foreign consortia gave sizable golden parachutes
to departing Communist managers in return for undervaluing tha. purchased facility. The
Apisz stationery chain sold for one-seventh its value and the departing manager left with one-
third of the shares of the new company. The Hungarian government strengthened the position
of the State Property Agency in response to these abuses. Paul Knight, Strong domestic Inter.
est and controversy provoked by Hungary'sprivatization policy, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1990, § 1,
at 30.
70. Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990, art. l(1)(a).
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Property Agency. 71 The absence of any provisions regulating transac-
tions between foreign investors and state enterprises in the Amended
Hungarian Foreign Investment Law may mislead the foreign investor,
but this is not intentional. The statute which regulates transactions with
state enterprises makes no distinction between foreign and domestic
investors.
The statute, however, regulates only those transactions which in-
volve the transfer, contribution, or use of significant state assets. If a
non-financial contribution is greater than ten percent of the assets of the
enterprise and the value of the contribution exceeds HUF twenty million,
it is subject to approval.72 Property transfers of an intangible asset only
require approval if the value exceeds HUF thirty million;73 the transfer
of land as an asset is subject to approval if its value exceeds HUF one
million;74 and the transfer of other fixed assets requires approval if the
value of the asset exceeds HUF fifty million.7" Any contract such as a
rental or lease agreement which causes the transfer of rights of usage,
utilization, or collection of proceeds of more than fifty percent of the
enterprise's assets also requires approval. 76 For the purposes of calcula-
tion, the value of all contracts concluded within two calendar years are
totaled.77
In Poland, the 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law regulates trans-
actions between a foreign investor and a state enterprise.78 It requires
approval of all such transactions. Any in kind distribution of a state
enterprise in order to create a company or purchase a share in such a
company requires the approval of M.O.C.79 In addition, a state enter-
prise may not conclude an agreement which provides the use or owner-
ship of state property for a period greater than six months without
permit approval.80
71. Id art. l(1)(b)-(d). The State Property Agency supervises the process of privatization
and has broad authority under Hungarian Law No. VII of 1990.
72. Id art. l(1)(a).
73. Id art. 1(1)(b).
74. Id art. l(1)(c)
75. Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990, art. l(1)(d).
76. Id art. 1(1)(e).
77. Id art. 1(2).
78. It is important to note that the Hungarian statute makes no distinction between for-
eign and domestic investors in transactions with state enterprises.
79. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law arts. 4(l)(2), 6(1)(4), 30 I.LM. at 876.
80. Id art. 6(1)(3), 30 I.L.M. at 876.
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3. Discretionary Authority of the Government Agencies Over
the Approval Process
The legislative limits on the authority of the State Property Agency
and M.O.C. over the approval process vary greatly. In Hungary, Law
No. VIII of 1990 specifically defines and circumscribes the authority of
the State Property Agency in reviewing contracts 'between state enter-
prises and foreign individuals. In Poland, however, the 1991 Foreign In-
vestment Law delegates potentially greater discretionary authority to
M.O.C.
In Hungary, the language of Law No. VIII of 1990 defines the pro-
cedures for approval, limiting the authority of the State Property Agency
to ensuring the proper valuation of state assets. A state enterprise seek-
ing to enter into a transaction governed by the statute must report its
intention to the State Property Agency81 and must submit a valuation by
a registered auditor.82 The enterprise may conclude the transaction
within thirty days unless the State Property Agency takes one of three
steps allowed by the statute.8 3 The State Property Agency may require
that a new valuation be undertaken by an auditor chosen by the agency,84
it may call for a public tender to obtain the best value for the property if
it is an important transaction, 5 or it may prohibit the contract if it is of
obvious prejudice to the national economy.8 6
Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990 further circumscribes the author-
ity of the State Property Agency by providing for an appeal to the court
in case of a denial. Significantly, however, the foreign investor does not
have this right of appeal. The statute provides that if the Agency pre-
vents the transaction from occurring, the state enterprise may sue in
court within thirty days of the announcement.8 7
In Poland, regulation of transactions between ,,,late enterprises and
foreigners serves the same purpose as the Hungarian statute, 88 yet the
81. Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990, art. 3. If the company announces a public tender
or publicizes the transaction in two daily national newspapers and then obligates itself to con-
clude the transaction with a third party if it gets a better offer, the enterprise does not need to
report the transaction. Id. art. 6(b).
82. Idi art. 2.
83. Id. art. 4.
84. Id art. 5(l)(a).85. Id art. 5(l)(b).
86. Id art. 5(l)(c). Although the statute does not define what obvious prejudice means, it
would seem to imply that the government only has authority to reject cases which are blatantly
against state interests.
87. Id. art. 5(2).
88. The statute's regulation of in kind distributions operates to ensure that state-owned
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language governing the Polish government's authority to review transac-
tions is markedly broader. One article regulates the entire approval pro-
cess89 and the language is poorly drafted. There is no description of the
application process, nor any description of the powers of the Ministry in
anything other than general terms. The result is that the language of the
statute injects a great deal of ambiguity and uncertainty into the approval
process.
M.O.C., which has become the agency responsible for issuing permit
approvals or rejections,9' exercises broad discretion in this area. The
statute only requires that M.O.C. deny the permit when a company's
activities threaten state economic interests or state security.91 This dis-
cretion is broader than under the previous statute. Under the 1988 Po-
lish Foreign Investor Law, an application would be approved whenever
the business activity ensured the introduction of modem technologies
and management methods, 92 provision of goods and services for export,
93
improvement in the supply of modem and high quality products and
services to the domestic market,94 or the protection of the environment.
95
M.O.C. may formulate the conditions for investment in areas under
its authority.96 The statute provides that M.O.C. may set certain operat-
ing conditions in the permit.97 The statute empowers M.O.C. to establish
the ratio between the Polish and foreign parties' contributions to the
share (stock) capital of the company or the ratio between votes at the
partners' meeting,98 but it does not limit the authority of M.O.C. to im-
pose further conditions on the permit.99 Further, M.O.C.'s regulation is
ongoing, continuing after the transaction has been concluded. M.O.C.
assets are properly valued. See Ania M. Frankowska & Radoslaw A. Gronet, Introductory
Note to Poland Law on Companies With Foreign Participation, 30 LLM. 871 (1991).
89. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 17, 30 LLM. at 880.
90. Id. art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 877. This law eliminates the Foreign Investment Agency's
powers over the supervision of foreign investment (previously granted under articles 4 & 6 of
the 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law) and transfers them to the Ministry of Owmership
Transformations in article 41. Id. art. 41, 30 I.L.M. at 888.
91. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 17, 30 I.LM. at 880.
92. 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 5(2)(1), 28 LL.M. at 1522.
93. Id. art. 5(2)(2), 28 I.L.M. at 1522.
94. Id art. 5(2)(3), 28 I.L.M. at 1522.
95. Id. art. 5(2)(4), 28 I.L.M. at 1522.
96. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 16(2), 30 I.L.M. at 880.
97. Id
98. Id
99. M.O.C. could, for example, require that the foreign investor purchase other less valua-
ble assets of a state enterprise. In one case, Polish officials delayed the sale of a truck factory to
Volvo until the company agreed to also acquire a bankrupt firm. See Engelberg, supra note 5,
at C8.
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may revoke its permit if the company engages in activity which is not in
conformity with these conditions and refuses to cease the activity.'0°
M.O.C. may be required to issue a factual justification of a denial
when it refuses a permit for reasons other than state security. It is not
clear from the language of the statute whether this is a mandatory proce-
dure. The statute establishes that M.O.C. need not issue a factual justifi-
cation when it bases its denial on state security reasons. 10 1 By
implication, it may be required to issue one in other circumstances. Even
where M.O.C. issues a factual justification, however, there is no language
requiring that the justification be anything but cursory, and there is no
appeal. The statute does not include even a limited appeal to the head of
the agency.102
The state's limited purpose in regulating transactions with state en-
terprises does not justify the broad authority assigned to M.O.C. under
the statute. Separate provisions should govern the regulation of 4(1) ar-
eas and those necessary to regulate the valuation of state enterprises.
M.O.C. should be proscribed from establishing operating conditions
other than the ratio of foreign and state investments. Similarly, M.O.C.'s
continuing power to supervise the company after it has properly valued
the state assets smacks more of paternalism than necessity.
It is important to note that the present statute limits the independ-
ent action of the Agency after the permit approval has been issued. Un-
like the 1988 legislation, a company may be required to turn over its
books and records to the Agency so that it can determine whether the
company is within its proscribed activities.0 3 M.O.C. does not have an
unqualified right to enter the premises and review a company's books and
records."° If M.O.C. determines that the company acts in violation of
its permit, and the company refuses to change its conduct, M.O.C. must
go to court to dissolve the company.105 Actions taken in violation of
Articles 6 and 8 are null and void by law, 10 6 but in order to void actions
of the company taken in violation of Articles 4 and 6, M.O.C. must go
before the court.1"7
100. 1991 Polish Investment Law art. 19(3), 30 I.L.M. at 881.
101. Id. art. 17, 30 I.L.M. at 880.
102. The absence of an appeal even by the state enterprise contrasts with the position taken
by Hungary. It is also inconsistent with the treatment given when the state enterprise makes a
formal application to privatize pursuant to article 5 of the Polish Privatization Law.
103. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 19(2), 30 I.L.M. at 1526.
104. See 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 14, 28 I.L.M. at 1526.
105. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 19(4), 30 I.L.M. at 881.
106. Id. art. 9, 30 I.L.M. at 877.
107. Id. art. 20, 30 I.L.M. at 881.
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C. Role of the Tax Provisions in Regulating Foreign Investment
The elimination of significant restrictions on foreign investment
heightens the importance of the tax provisions as a method of regulating
foreign investment. In Hungary, the statute creates a scale of tax benefits
which are being used to promote participation in those sectors where
technological innovation or capital is critical. 10 The statute provides
significant tax concessions when more than half of the gross profits of the
company derive from the manufacture of goods,"°9 the hotel business t"0
or a list of particularly important activities,' and the registered capital
exceeds fifty million Forints with at least thirty percent foreign participa-
tion.'12 Previously, the capitalization requirement in the 1988 legislation
was only twenty-five million Forints,"I3 and the statute imposed neither a
capitalization requirement nor a minimum amount of foreign participa-
tion on particularly important activities." 4 Act XCVIII of 1990 also ex-
tended the schedule of particularly important activities from fourteen to
twenty-two.1 1
5
The tax treatment of foreign investors in Poland differs remarkably
from Hungary in that the language of the tax provisions is ambiguous
and vests in M.O.C. significant discretionary authority. The principal
provision, Article 23, begins: "[tlhe Minister of Finance may, upon an
affirmative opinion of an appropriate minister, exempt a Company from
corporate income tax... [under certain] circumstances." ' 6 While theo-
retically such discretion may work to the foreign investor's benefit, the
statute may also work to its detriment because of the uncertainty and
generality of the provision.
The guidelines for granting an exemption are fairly general. A for-
eign investor may be entitled to an exemption whenever the foreign
party's contribution to a company exceeds two million ECUs,1 17 and the
108. Francis Gabor, Hungarian Amendments Seek to Boot Out Bureaucracy and Entice
Foreign Investment, 2 P.S.S.E.E.L. 5, 5 (Mar. 1991).
109. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 15(2Xa), 2 HR.LF. at 308.
110. Iad
111. Iad § 15(2)(b), 2 H.R.L.F. at 309. These activities include electronics manufacturing,
manufacture of vehicle component parts, machine-tool production, manufacture of agricul-
tural, food processing, and forestry machines, packing technology, manufacturing of pharma-
ceutical products, and tourism. See 2 H.LL.F. at 320-25.
112. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law §§ 15(2)(a), 15 (2)(b), 2 H.L.F. at
308-09.
113. Id § 15(2)(b), 2 HR.L.F. at 309.
114. Id. § 15(2)(c), 2 H.R.L.F. at 309.
115. Gabor, supra note 108, at 5.
116. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 23(l), 30 I.LM. at 882 (emphasis added).
117. ara rt.23(l)(1), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
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company participates in a region suffering high unemployment, 811 its ac-
tivity would ensure the introduction of new technology 19 or its export
sales comprise twenty percent or more of total sales.120 Foreign parties
are also eligible for exemption when they purchase shares or stock from
the State Treasury.121
The statute does not make clear who has the authority to grant an
exemption. It would appear that the Minister of Finance may only be
able to issue an exemption where the "appropriate minister," in this case
M.O.C.,122 concurs. The statute states that only after the application has
been reviewed and passed on by M.O.C., the Minister of Finance may
decide whether a company qualifies. 123 Further, only "upon an affirma-
tive opinion" of M.O.C., does the Minister of Finance have authority to
issue an exemption. 124
Similarly, the statute does not adequately limit the authority of the
Minister of Finance and M.O.C. to disapprove an application when it
appears to qualify under the statute. First, it entirely fails to address
whether M.O.C. may disapprove the application berore passing it on to
the Minister of Finance. Second, the statute only provides that the Min-
ister of Finance may set forth conditions in the permit, "or, due to im-
portant economic reasons, deny the exemption."'' 25 While the language
implies that the Minister of Finance may only deny the permit when
important economic reasons exist, there is no requirement that there be a
factual justification which could expose the arbitrariness of a decision.
D. Ownership Rights and Protection of Foreign Investment
1. Right to Own Property
The laws of ownership are principally governed by legislation other
than the foreign investment laws. The right to property is guaranteed
under the Hungarian'26 and Polish Constitutions.' 27 Pursuant to this
118. Id. art. 23(1)(2)(a), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
119. Id art. 23(1)(2)(b), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
120. Id art. 23(l)(2)(c), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
121. Id art. 23(5), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
122. See id. art. 23(4), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
123. Id
124. Id. art. 23(1), 30 LL.M. at 882.
125. Id art. 23(2), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
126. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY art. 13(1), 1 H.R.L.F. 1624, 1627
(1990).
127. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND art. 6 in CONSTITUTIONS OF T1lE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flauz eds., 1991). See also
Marek Kaszubski & Marty Collins, Polish and Hungarian Constitutional Developments Com-
pared, P.S.S.E.E.L. Mar. 1991 at 3, 3.
[Vol. 15
Foreign Participation in Hungary & Poland
right, property may only be expropriated in exceptional circumstances
when it is a matter of public interest, and compensation must be paid.12 1
In Hungary, Act I of 1987 governs ownership of land by foreigners.12 9
In Poland, foreign ownership of land is governed by the 1920 Law on
Real Estate Acquisition by Foreigners130 with recent amendments.
1 3 1
The rights of foreigners to own property under the existing statutes,
however, may be varied by the provisions of the foreign investment laws.
In practice, this principle has only been illustrated in Hungary where the
provisions of section 19 of the Hungarian Foreign Investment Law con-
flicted with a corresponding interpretation of the provisions in Hun-
garian Act I of 1987. Under the Hungarian Act I of 1987, any purchase
of real property by a foreigner requires a permit by the Ministry of Fi-
nance.132 The Council of Ministers classified domestic companies with
foreign participation as foreign entities under the Land Law and required
them to apply for a permit, pursuant to Decree 145/1989 of the Council
of Ministers. 133
In 1990, the Hungarian Constitutional Court annulled the decree of
the Council of Ministers. 134 Under the Amended Hungarian Foreign In-
vestment Law, a company with foreign participation could acquire real
property so long as it relates to carrying out the business of the com-
pany. 35 The Constitutional Court stated that to require a permit for
those domestic companies with foreign participation would conflict with
the provisions of the Amended Foreign Investment Law.136
Since the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, nullilying
128. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY art. 13(2), I H.R.LF. at 1627; CON-
STITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND art. 7.
129. Hungarian Act I of 1987, 1 H.R.L.F. 547. Act I of 1987 has been amended several
times since its enactment. See supra note 31. See also Gov't. Decree No. 71/1991 on Acquisi-
tion of Real Estate by Foreigners, 3 H.LL.F. 164 (1991).
130. Dziennik Ustaw, 1933, no.24, item 202. See Wojciech Bialik, Amendments to the Po-
lish Real Estate Law Allow Sale of Land and Buildings, P.S.S.E.E.L. Jan. 1991 at 4, 4.
131. Law of 29 Sept. 1990, [Amendments to the Law on Land Management and Real
Estate Expropriation] Dziennik Ustaw, 1990, no. 79, item 464.
132. Hungarian Act I of 1987, § 38.
133. Decree of 145/1989 (XII.27.); MT of the Council of Ministers on Acquisition of Real
Estate by Foreigners arts. 1, 2, under authority given by article 70 of modified law 1 of 19[0]7
on land.
134. Resolution No. 12/1990 (V.23.) AB of the Constitutionality Court on the Unconstitu-
tionality of the Decree of the Council of Ministers on the Acquisition of Immovable Property
by Foreigners, 1 H.R.L.F. 819 (1990).
135. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law, § 19(a), 2 H.R.LF. at 311. The stat-
ute further provides that the company is at liberty to deal with its assets freely. Id. § 19(b), 2
H.RtL.F. at 311.
136. Kaszubski & Collins, supra note 127, at 5.
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Decree No. 145/1989 of the Council of Ministers, the Hungarian govern-
ment has issued new regulations pertaining to the acquisition of real
property by foreigners 137 under Hungarian Act 1 of 1987 on Land.13
The regulations govern the process and the standards by which a for-
eigner may receive a permit to purchase Hungarian real property. More
specifically, they only regulate acquisition of real property by foreign
legal entities and foreign private individuals, 139 not including non-Hun-
garian permanent residents."4 As in other cases, the Finance Ministry
has broad discretion to grant the permit. It appears, though it is not
entirely clear from the language of the statute, that the Finance Ministry
may approve a permit so long as it does not violate state, local, or general
societal interests, 4 ' and there is no right of appeal against the decision of
the Finance Ministry. 42 Unless otherwise stipulated by statute, a for-
eigner may not acquire arable land or protected nature conservation
areas. 143
In contrast to the Hungarian law, the Polish Law on Real Estate
Acquisition by Foreigners requires that any foreign person, including a
foreign controlled domestic corporation, must obtain a permit to
purchase real property. 44 There are some indications;, however, that ob-
taining this permit may not be particularly difficult. From August 1988
to the end of 1989, 325 foreigners obtained permits.' 41 In 1990, the gov-
ernment received 589 applications, 565 of which were granted.
2. Foreign Investment Guarantees
The foreign investment laws of both Hungary and Poland guarantee
the value of a foreigner's investment in the event of a expropriation.
1 46
In Hungary, an event of nationalization, expropriation or similar meas-
ures effecting the foreign ownership 4 7 entitles the investor to automatic
137. Government Decree No. 171/1991 (Dec. 27), On Acquisition of Real Estate By For-
eigners, 3 H.R.L.F. 164 (January 15, 1992).
138. See Art. 38, 70 of Hungarian Act I of 1987 on Land.
139. Id
140. Id at Art. 4(2).
141. Id. at Art. l(1)(a).
142. Id at Art. 2(4).
143. Id. at Art. 1(5).
144. Bialik, supra note 130, at 4.
145. Stanislaw Filipczak, Investments; A Long and Winding Road, THE WARSAW VOICE,
Aug. 4, 1991.
146. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 22, 30 I.L.M. at 881-82; Amended Hun-
garian Foreign Investment Law § 1, 2 H.R.L.F. at 305.
147. This language currently exists in the present version of section 1(2) of the Amended
Hungarian Foreign Investment Law and may serve to protect the foreign investor in circum-
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indemnification.14 In Poland, the statute provides for indemnification
for losses caused by expropriation 149 or any other acts with equivalent
results. 15
0
These guarantees may represent psychological reassurance to the in-
vestor, but substantively are not necessary in light of the similar guaran-
tees under the Polish and Hungarian constitutions."5 ' The process for
compensating investors, however, may be of some importance. Neither
statute fully establishes a set of procedures for compensation, but both
provide certain protections. The Hungarian statute guarantees immedi-
ate compensation in the currency of the investment,15 2 and establishes
that the right to indemnification in Hungary is actionable under the
law.' 3 The provision states that "application shall lie before the Court
of Justice in case of any contravention of the law.""I In Poland, the
process has yet to be defined under a separate set of regulations,15 5 how-
ever the Polish statute provides that a foreign investor may repatriate the
full amount of compensation. 5 6
3. Reprivatization
The status of foreign investment cannot be entirely certain until ade-
quate laws are developed regarding reprivatization. Compensation for
the claims of previous owners of nationalized property or the return of
the seized property (collectively "reprivatization") has become an issue
of great concern to the legislatures of Hungary and Poland.
By the end of February [1991] the Ministry of Ownership Transforma-
tion alone had received 550 applications concerning the return of flour
mills, chemists' shops, breweries and food processing plants. Twenty-
nine former hotel owners, 338 former farmland owners and 121 own-
stances unrelated to expropriation or nationalization. Specifically, it may serve to protect the
foreign investor where there is a threat of disenfranchisement through prior claims. See dis-
cussion following respecting the laws governing property ownership.
148. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 1(2), 2 HLR.LF. at 305.
149. In Poland, pursuant to Amendments to the Law on Land Management and Real Es-
tate Expropriation, Dziennik Ustaw, 1990, no. 79, item 464, the state may only expropriate real
estate necessary for the construction and maintenance of public roads, communications de-
vices, utilities, elementary schools, hospitals, cemeteries, sanitary utilities, national defense
installations, public housing, and "other obvious public purposes." See Bialik, supra note 130,
at 4.
150. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 22(l), 30 I.LM. at 881.
151. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
152. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 1(2), 2 H.R.LF. at 305.
153. Id § 1(3), 2 H.R.L.F. at 305.
154. Id
155. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 22(2), 30 I.L.M. at 882.
156. Id art. 26(3), 30 I.L.M. at 883-84.
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ers of plots and buildings are also demanding that their property be
returned. Eighty-two applications concern factories and large indus-
trial plants, 5 concern mines and 6 are for river barges. More than
50,000 applications for the return of various objects and real estate
have been filed with local authorities throughout the country.
15 7
However, the resolution of this issue has become tied up in the legisla-
tures because of the persistence of certain factions and the intervention of
the courts. 158
Hungary has passed legislation in response to the problem, Law
XXV of 1991 on Partial Compensation for Damages Unlawfully Caused
by the State to Properties Owned by Citizens in the Interest of Settling
Ownership Relations.15 9 In large part, the statute would resolve many of
the concerns of investors. The statute provides for compensation to for-
mer owners.1 6" Where practicable the former owner may obtain an op-
tion to reacquire the property. 161 An option is practicable only provided
the property has not been acquired by a resident or is not currently
owned by a newly private company whose shares have been sold to inves-
tors or a company formed by an in-kind contribution with property in
dispute.162 The statute does not seem, however, to protect property
which is purchased by a wholly foreign owned company.
The constitutionality of this statute, however, is in some doubt
based on prior opinions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. On Oc-
tober 4, 1990, the Constitutional Court issued a unanimous opinion in
response to inquiries of the legislature on the issue of reprivatization.
163
In its opinion, the Court indicated that the compensation of former own-
ers unconstitutionally discriminated against those citizens who lost no
property during the nationalization.1" The Court concluded that the
former owners lacked any valid right to former properties. (The Hun-
garian Constitution provides that the state has exclusive right to nation-
alized property.) The Court indicated that such a statute would only
pass constitutional muster if the state could show that the statute "would
157. Dorota J. Bartyzel, Reprivatization; Great Expectations-Limited Promises, TIM
WARSAW VOICE, Mar. 31, 1991.
158. See, eg., Ethan Klingsberg, Hungary: The Constitutional Politics of Compensation, 2
P.S.S.E.E.L. 1, 8 (June 1991); Telephone Conversation with Prof. Andrzej Szlezak, Professor
of Law, Poznan University (Feb. 17, 1992).
159. 2 H.R.L.F. 1127 (Aug. 15, 1991).
160. Id. 1.
161. Id 9.
162. Id.
163. Decision 21/1990 (X.4) AB. See Klingsberg, supra note 158, at 1.
164. Klingsberg, supra note 158, at 2.
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cause a more favorable total social result."' 65
A subsequent opinion of the Court, however, indicates that some
form of compensation might be acceptable. In 1991 the Court unani-
mously struck down a proposed draft of the statute," but appeared to
change its position from October 1990.167 Rather than focusing on the
inherent unconstitutionality of reprivatization, the Court struck down
the draft because it failed to compensate victims of pre-1949 nationaliza-
tions. 6 ' Consequently, the existing statute which has been passed com-
pensates both the victims of pre-1949 and post-1949 nationalizations. 169
In Poland, the legislature has not yet passed a statute resolving the
questions raised by reprivatization. It had been prepared to implement a
plan denying any claims of nationalization where the state had seized the
property pursuant to legislation enacted by the Communist govern-
ment.' 70 The legislature, however, did not adopt this approach. Instead,
it has agreed that proposals for a plan will be submitted to the legislature
in March 1992.11' It is not likely, however, that this deadline will be
met, as no proposals currently exist which are reasonably likely to garner
sufficient support.' 72
In the absence of laws addressing reprivatization claims, the foreign
investor may still be protected. It is possible that the indemnity guaran-
tees respecting expropriation may have some application to this problem.
A statute or judgment which would allow pre-Communist owners to re-
take property would be action by the state which would effectively result
in expropriation. Although the principal intent of the provisions may
have been to assuage fears of renewed nationalizations, 1Il the language
"similar measures effecting the foreign ownership" and "any other acts
with equivalent results" may very well apply.174
The provisions of bilateral trade agreements may also provide pro-
tection. The Hungarian statute provides that if an international agree-
ment contradicts the substantive terms of the Hungarian Foreign
165. R
166. Decision 28/1991 (VI.3) A.
167. Id. at 1.
168. Id.
169. 2 H.R.L.F. 1127 (Aug. 15, 1991).
170. Bartyzel, supra note 157. Only those claims arising from nationalizations, which were
not pursuant to statutory authorization, would be satisfied.
171. Telephone Conversation with Prof. Andrzej Szlezak (Feb. 17, 1992).
172. Id.
173. See, eg., Francis Gabor, The Quest for Transformation to a Market Economy: Priva-
tization and Foreign Investment in Hungary, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 269, 296 (1991).
174. Seesupra notes 146-50 and accompanying text of this article for further discussion of
the current state of this matter.
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Investment Law, the international trade agreement controls.17 5 There is
no express provision in the Polish Foreign Investment Law which states
a similar proposition. However, it is understood that a treaty between
two nations controls over domestic law. 176
Finally, it appears that the state may be willing to assume responsi-
bility for third party reprivatization claims in individual cases. The Po-
lish treasury took this step when it sold shares in the newly privatized
furniture maker, Swarzedskie. Under the terms of the prospectus,
M.O.C. promised to assume responsibility for all claims against property
which had been duly registered in the name of the state or the company,
and for which there were no administrative decisions depriving the origi-
nal owners of their titles.177 Any property held by the company which
was not duly registered in the name of the state or company, however,
was classified as "at risk" and not protected against any claims which
might arise. 171
E. Expatriation of Profits and Other Provisions Which Facilitate
Investment
The provisions for repatriation of profits in Hungary and Poland are
almost identical, with minor exceptions. 179 In both countries, a foreign
investor may repatriate its share of profits.'8 0 In Poland, the investor
may repatriate those profits only after paying applicable taxes and ob-
taining an audit certificate.1"' The foreign investor may also transfer
abroad proceeds from the sale or liquidation of an investor's stock, 182 its
share of the proceeds from a company's liquidation'8 3 or indemnification
175. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 6, 2 H.R.L.F. at 306.
176. See Jerzy Rajski, The New Legal Framework of the Economic Activity of Foreigners in
Poland, 4 & 5 REVUE DE DROITS DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALIS 531, 546 (1990).
177. Public Offering of Swarzedzkie Fabryki Mebli S.A., P.I, § 3(ii) (1991).
178. Id. P.III, § 7.2.
179. In Poland, a foreign investor may change its zlotys profit for foreign currency. 1991
Polish Foreign Investment Law, arts. 25, 26, 30 I.L.M. at 871, 883 (1991). The Hungarian
statute provides that the profit be transferred abroad in the currency of the investment.
Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 32(1), 2 H.R.L.F. at 313. Where the invest-
ment arises from a contribution of property or the reinvestment of profits, the currency of
investment is deemed to be the legal tender where the foreigner is domiciled. Id.
180. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 25(1), 30 I.L.M. at 883. Amended Hun-
garian Foreign Investment Law § 32(1), 2 H.R.L.F. at 313.
181. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 25(1), 30 I.L.M. at 883.
182. Id., art. 26(3)(1), 30 I.L.M. at 883; Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law
§ 32(1), 2 H.R.L.F. at 313.
183. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 26(3)(2), 30 I.L.M. at 883-84; Amended
Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 32 (1), (2), 2 H.R.L.F. at 313-14.
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proceeds from expropriation."8 4
The only substantial difference between the repatriation provisions
is the amount of compensation which may be repatriated by foreign em-
ployees. Employees of a Polish company may transfer abroad any com-
pensation they receive provided the company issues a certificate
reflecting that amount of compensation.18 5 In Hungary, fifty percent of
the salaries of foreign employees, officers and partners may be freely
transferred abroad. 1 6
Both countries have also relaxed the restrictions on the form of in-
vestment. In Hungary, under the 1988 legislation, cash contributions to
a Hungarian venture had to be in convertible currency. 7 Poland placed
a similar requirement on foreign investment.188 Presently, a foreign in-
vestor in Hungary can use its forint 8 9 profits in a Hungarian company to
invest in an existing company, create a new company or increase capi-
tal. 'I Similarly, in Poland, an investor can invest its share of profits and
proceeds from a sale or liquidation of stock, or proceeds from the distri-
bution assets of a company.' 91 Additionally, Poland no longer requires
a minimum foreign capital contribution under its foreign investment
law. 192
F. Transformation of State Enterprises: Alienation of Shares
The opportunities for investment in newly privatizing companies are
impressive because of the vast numbers of enterprises which will be trans-
ferred to private owners. Although some estimates establish that the pri-
vate sector accounts for twenty-five to thirty percent of Hungary's
economy and up to forty percent of Poland's economy,193 a significant
portion of industry remains under state ownership. It is estimated that
between seventy-five and ninety percent of industries in Hungary and
Poland are owned by the state. 9 As of September 1991, Hungary had
about 2,300 state owned firms, and Poland about 7,500.191
184. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 26(3)(3), 30 I.L.M. at 883-84; Amended
Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 32(1), 2 H.R.LF. at 313.
185. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 28(1), 30 I.L.M. at 884.
186. Id. art. 33, 30 I.LM. at 885-86.
187. Former Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 12(1).
188. 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 16(2)(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1526.
189. The forint is the national currency of Hungary.
190. Amended Hungarian Foreign Investment Law § 12(1), 2 H.RLLF. at 307.
191. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 10, 30 LLM. at 877-78.
192. See 1988 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 2, 28 I.L.M. at 1520.
193. Too Many Firms; Too Few Buyers, supra note 62, at survey 14.
194. Id at survey 17.
195. Owners Are the Only Answer, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at survey 10.
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Pursuant to the privatization laws, the supervision of privatization is
vested in a single "super-agency." In Hungary, the State Property
Agency (S.P.A.) is the responsible supervisory body.196 Its tasks include
bringing state enterprises under state administrative supervision, 197 pre-
paring for sale of the companies under its supervision, 198 and, in excep-
tional circumstances, management. 199 In Poland, the authority of the
agency is vested in the M.O.C.2° At their discretion, S.P.A. and M.O.C.
affect the speed of change and the extent to which foreign investors may
participate on beneficial terms through their discretionary power.
1. The Process of Transformation of State Enterprises
The process of privatizing state enterprises in Hungary and Poland
involves a two stages. In the first stage, the state enterprise is trans-
formed into a private company. This can occur in three ways. First,
M.O.C. or S.P.A. may order the state enterprise to privatize. S.P.A. may
agree to transform an enterprise even if the enterprise objects. 20 1 Simi-
larly, in Poland, the Prime Minister, upon the request of M.O.C. may
order the transformation.20 2 Secondly, the enterprise itself can initiate
the process by application to S.P.A. or M.O.C.. Either the founding
body of the state enterprise requests the transformation, 20 3 or the major-
ity of the managing enterprise council or of a general meeting of the em-
ployees makes the request. 2"
The process of transformation is not automatic where the state en-
terprise itself initiates the process. Both S.P.A. and M.O.C. must ap-
prove the transformation. In Hungary, S.P.A. has broad powers to
approve the transformation, but any disapproval is subject to the review
of the court.20 5 Under its powers of approval, the S.P.A. gives an opin-
ion about the transformation plan, makes recommendations if neces-
sary,2" 6 and establishes any conditions it finds necessary. 20 7 "Within
thirty days from registering the reported intentions of transformation,
196. See Hungarian Law No. VII of 1990.
197. Id. art. 10(e).
198. Id. art. 10(f).
199. Id. art. 10(h).
200. Law on the Establishment of the Ministry of Ownership Transformations.
201. Id. § 1.3.
202. Polish Privatization Law, art. 6(1), 29 I.L.M. 1226 (1990).
203. Hungarian Privatization Law § 16; Polish Privatization Law, art. 5(l)(2), 29 I.L,M.
1226 (1990).
204. Hungarian Privatization Law § 17; Polish Privatization Law, art. 5(l)(1), 29 I.L.M,
1226 (1990).
205. Hungarian Law No. VII of 1990, art. 13(4).
206. Id. art. 13(1).
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the S.P.A., along with the company, will determine the conditions of
transformation... the conditions of sale .... '20 The enterprise only has
the discretion to decide whether or not to go forward with the transac-
tion.2' If the transformation "interferes with the interests of the society
or it can be detrimental to the national economy," the S.P.A. can pro-
hibit the transaction within sixty days of submission of the plan. 1 °
The Polish Privatization Law also provides similar authority to
M.O.C.. The Ministry may determine the statute or charter of a newly
formed corporation;21  it may also issue conditions pursuant to a denial
which, if satisfied, would entitle the application to be reconsidered; 12 it
may order the preparation of a financial analysis of the enterprise to en-
sure that proper value is obtained for the shares;21  it may condition sales
upon the introduction of certain changes to the successor corporation;21 4
and it may determine the method of sale necessary to achieve the greatest
value for the company." ' It may also deny the application for transfor-
mation "due to economic and financial conditions of the enterprise or an
important state interest. '216 The denial must be issued within three
months from the date of the request.217 It must be "rational" and "rea-
soned" and the state enterprise may challenge the law pursuant to article
61 of the Law on State-Owned Enterprises. 218
In the second stage of privatization, shares in the newly created
companies are sold. The S.P.A. and M.O.C. exercise the authority to
alienate shares of newly privatized companies. In Hungary, Law No.
VII of 1990 authorizes the S.P.A. to sell state property to either foreign
or domestic investors.2 19 Similarly, the Polish Privatization Law pro-
vides that the Ministry of Ownership Changes makes all the decisions
regarding alienation of shares owned by the State Treasury."2 For ex-
ample, it may call for a sale through a public auction, a public offering,
207. STATE PROPERTY AGENCY, INFORMATION ON THE PRIVATIZATION OF STATE
OwD ENTERPRISES 5-7 (1990).
208. Id at 6 (emphasis added).
209. Id at 7.
210. Hungarian Law No. VII of 1990, art. 13(4).
211. Polish Privatization Law, art. 10, 29 I.L.M. 1226 (1990).
212. Id art. 5(4).
213. Id art. 20.
214. Id art. 21.
215. Id art. 23(4).
216. Id art. 5(3).
217. Id art. 5(4).
218. Id
219. Hungarian Law No. VII of 1990, art. 25(2).
220. Polish Privatization Law, art. 19(1), 29 I.L.M. 1226 (1990).
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or a negotiated sale after public invitation.22'
2. Discretionary Authority of M.O.C. and S.P.A. in the
Privatization of Industry: The Role of Foreign
Investment
Directives issued by the Polish and Hungarian legislatures purport
to circumscribe the authority of the S.P.A. and M.O.C. in the privatiza-
tion of industry. The Polish Privatization Law provides that the Sejm,
the lower house of parliament, "shall vote annual directives" to guide the
M.O.C.. 22 2 "The Council of Ministers shall list in the form of a decree,
state-owned enterprises especially important for the national economy;
privatization of which requires a permit from the Council of Minis-
ters. '223 Similarly, in Hungary, the State Property Agency must imple-
ment the privatization program according to the terms of the law and the
Asset Policy Guidelines.224
The extent to which these directives actually circumscribe authority
over foreign participation is questionable. It is not clear that the direc-
tives issued by the Polish and Hungarian legislatures specifically define
the role which foreign investors will play in the privatization process.
Rather, the role continues to be defined in a piecemeal fashion, by spe-
cific legislative acts225 or discretionary decisions by the supervisory agen-
cies in individual circumstances, based on general notions of state
interest,226 or on general guidelines issued pursuant to legislative direc-
tives. In Hungary, the 1990 State Asset Policy Guidelines2 27 only direct
that the S.P.A. should sell property where the enterprise might expect
significant technological development, foreign ownership would benefit
external industries, or the state debts can be reasonably reduced.228
Proposals indicate that more viable alternative, exist. In Hungary,
221. Id art. 23(1).
222. Id. art. 2(l).
223. Id. art. 2(2).
224. Hungarian Law No. VII of 1990, art. 25(1). Decree No. 20/1990 of the Parliament
on the Asset Policy Guidelines in 1990, § 4.
225. For example, see Act LXXIV of 1990 on privatization, sile, utilization of assets of
state enterprises dealing with retail sale catering trade and consumer services.
226. For example, pursuant to its powers, the S.P.A. may prevent the sale of shares to third
parties if it determines that a better offer is possible, the sale would result in injuring competi-
tion, or it involves an industry which should remain in the control of the state. Decree No.
20/1990 of the Parliament on the Asset Policy Guidelines in 1990, § 1.4.
227. The basic elements probably did not change significantly in 1991. E. Lukacs, Com-
mentary on Decree No. 20/1990 of the Parliament on the Asset Policy Guide-lines In 1990.
228. Decree No. 20/1990, § 2.3. For these purposes, the State Property Agency treats
foreign controlled Hungarian corporations as foreign corporations. See id.
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the Ownership and Privatization Committee, affiliated with the Govern-
ment's Economic Cabinet, has proposed developing an annual list of
companies in which state ownership will be maintained. 2 9 Companies
not on the exemptions list could be wholly sold off without any restric-
tions."0 A similar concept may be applied to the regulation of foreign
participation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hungarian and Polish approaches to the regulation of foreign
investment are remarkably similar. Both have achieved significant ac-
complishments in encouraging the participation of foreign capital. In the
private sector, the foreign investor has great freedom in participating in
domestic companies as well as forming new ventures. The restrictions on
currency convertibility and forms of contribution have been virtually
eliminated. Hungary retains a restriction only on the free expatriation of
profits with respect to foreign employees.
The critical problem in the present legislation is the failure of the
laws to adequately define the conduct of the state "super-agencies," or
provide independent review of their decisions. The legal framework re-
lies to a large extent on the discretion of the S.P.A. and M.O.C.. The
statutes fail to establish explicit standards for determining when a foreign
investor may participate and fail to adequately determine the scope of
authority of these agencies. This problem also occurs in the decisions of
the other administrative agencies, affecting foreign investors, but the
greatest impact is probably felt through the power of the super-agencies.
The situation is most acute in Poland. M.O.C. has significant au-
thority to regulate transactions involving foreign investors. In transac-
tions with state enterprises, the 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law fails
to tailor the authority of M.O.C. to ensuring the proper valuation of as-
sets, as does the Hungarian legislation. Rather, it assigns broad discre-
tion to M.O.C. in approving the venture, and continuing authority to
regulate the transaction after its conclusion. As another example, tax
incentives to foreign investors rest on the broad discretion of the Polish
government. The 1991 Foreign Investment Law delegates the decision
whether a company may qualify for a tax exemption to the discretion of
the Minister of Finance and M.O.C. rather than creating a detailed
229. Proposal on Privatization Strategies in Hungary, MTI HuNGARIAN NEWS AGENCY,
June 3, 1991.
230. Id
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schedule of those investments which shall be accorded preferential tax
rates. In all of this, there is no independent review.
In the area of privatization, however, the problem is shared equally
by both the Polish and Hungarian governments. While flexibility is im-
portant, ad hoc determinations, of whether foreign capital may partici-
pate and on what terms, are clearly inadequate. A more comprehensive
approach must be taken. This can only occur through greater resort to
the law.
Statistics and examples underscore the importance of implementing
changes. As of September 1991, the number of firms in each country in
which a controlling stake had been sold to foreign investors was less than
ten.231 In Hungary, the State Property Agency announced on September
14, 1990, the names of twenty relatively healthy state enterprises which
were to be privatized. Only three of the twenty cotuld have total foreign
ownership.232 The State Property Agency limited foreign ownership of
all the others to between thirty and fifty percent.2"3 Other actions by
M.O.C. and the S.P.A. have also discouraged foreign investment. For
example, in a somewhat controversial move, the S.P.A. intervened at the
last minute to prevent the creation of a joint venture between Hun-
garoton and British E.M.I. company, which wanted to acquire a fifty
percent stake.234 In Poland, officials held up the sale of a truck factory to
Volvo when they required Volvo to agree to acquire a notoriously bank-
rupt factory.235
In the absence of change, the foreign investor remains a passive ob-
server in the process of privatization. Such an investor may only take the
lead in investing by directly negotiating with state enterprises over the
contribution, sale or lease of its assets. In Hungary, an application to
engage in a transaction with a state enterprise is deemed to be granted
unless the S.P.A. responds within thirty days, 236 and if it does respond,
its powers over denying the application are clearly defined.237 Similarly,
in Poland, M.O.C. must respond within two months. 238 This approach
brings with it, however, the attendant difficulties of negotiating in earnest
231. Too Many Firms, Too Few Buyers, supra note 62, at survey 17.
232. Id
233. Id.
234. Karoly Okoliesanyi, Privatization: Two Cautious Steps, REP. ON E. EUR. Oct, 19,
1990 at 24, 26.
235. Engelberg, supra note 5. Renault, Volvo's partner, has continued the talks, but has not
concluded an agreement.
236. Hungarian Law No. VIII of 1990, art. 4.
237. See id. art. 5.
238. 1991 Polish Foreign Investment Law, art. 18, 30 I.L.M. at 880.
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with managers and employees whose interests vary with the interests of
the enterprise itself. 9
The questions of ownership, which have yet to be resolved, may
eclipse these other concerns. A foreign investor must be aware of the
attendant hazards. In the absence of laws resolving the question of
reprivatization, the investor should attempt to more clearly establish the
extent of rights and protections under the foreign investment laws and
bilateral treaties, as well as specific guarantees and provisions which may
exist within individual privatization offerings.
239. The managers and employees of the state enterprise may very well have vested inter-
ests in maintaining the status quo. As one commentator noted,
Employees would welcome very much foreign investment, provided that everything
would stay as it is--so that you have foreign investors coming with money and the
enterprise going on as it has been. They are very much afraid that new owners, or
foreign investors, may immediately reduce employment to thirty percent because this
would make the enterprise efficient. In fact, quite often employees try to hinder the
transformation.
Marek Wierzbowski, Eastern Europe: Observations and Investment Strategies, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 385, 387 (1991) (emphasis added). Additional problems may arise. Calcula-
tion of the valuation of the assets of a state enterprise may result in enormously inflated values
under Eastern European methods of accounting.
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